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Science and religion are most usually compared on epistemic grounds: what do they tell us 
about the natural world and what methods do they use to determine those truths? The 
suggestion here is that the two fields should be compared on moral grounds: how do 
scientific and religious experiences affect the way a person lives his or her life? A hypothesis 
is presented in this vein: engaging in scientific work or education alters a person’s moral 
outlook on everyday matters. In this chapter, I articulate and motivate this claim by framing it 
against both theological and philosophical debate. I explore how it might be tested as a claim 
in moral psychology. The resulting vision presented here is of science and religion engaged 
in dialogue—at times necessarily embroiled—not only about the nature of the world, but 
regarding how best we navigate our way in it. 
1. The Problem of Polarisation 
In his 1989 Gifford lectures, Religion in an Age of Science, Ian Barbour presented a 
categorisation of theories that was to become the standard in the field of science and religion: 
a theory might portray the relationship between science and religion as one of conflict, 
independence, dialogue or integration (1990). Barbour’s purpose was to give an overview of 
the prominent positions of the time in order to create a backdrop for his own narrative, which 
contained elements of both dialogue and integration. For almost thirty years, the resulting 
four-fold classification has set the scene for further discussion; it remains the prominent 
meta-theory in the field, despite acknowledgement of its weaknesses and suggestions for 
modification, clarification and alternative models, scholarship which has been both 
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summarised and enriched by Mikael Stenmark (2004). One widely accepted criticism of 
Barbour’s classification is its epistemic bias: the relationship between science and religion is 
only analysed by comparing the truth claims made by each (Cantor and Kenny, 2001; Evans 
and Evans, 2008). Because the generation of knowledge is plausibly a more complete 
description of science than of religion, the concern is that the resulting classification unfairly 
ignores the many other roles that religion plays in society, including its rituals, prayers and 
ceremonies. Barbour’s work itself heeds the richness of religious experience; the problem is 
usually located in the influence and application of his classification. John Evans and Michael 
Evans have gone further, arguing that an epistemological focus has permeated Western 
academic thought in its entirety, including the entire field of sociology, long before Barbour’s 
contribution to the debate regarding science and religion (2008). 
The criticism is true as far as it goes, but instead of clarifying and improving our 
understanding of the relationship between science and religion, it exacerbates what may in 
fact be a more pressing issue resulting from the hold of Barbour’s work upon the field. 
Accepting the existence of non-epistemic roles for religion in society provides reasons for 
holding on to religion in the face of conflict with science, but it only does so by emphasising 
a division of labour between the two. If we suppose that science (and only science) deals with 
metaphysical truth whereas religion (and only religion) deals with moral truth, there is much 
less space for the two fields to interact. This results in a polarisation of the options available, 
encouraging either theories of conflict or those of independence. A prominent view that rose 
in influence in the decade after Barbour’s work, for example, was the hypothesis that that 
science and religion, if pursued properly, are independent domains of knowledge (Gould, 
1999). 
For Barbour himself, the purpose of his classification was to prepare for the 
consideration and development of positive narratives about the relationship between science 
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and religion. Given this aim, its greatest failure would be the encouragement of viewpoints of 
independence and conflict at the expense of those of dialogue and integration. Although the 
literature shows that most scholars in the field assume that science and religion can—and 
should—be in dialogue, the community also acknowledges that this viewpoint is not shared 
in wider academic and public circles. As Colin Russell puts it, the existence of conflict 
between science and religion has been “unconsciously assimilated as part of the growing 
wisdom of our day” (2002, p. 10). Amidst growing concerns of how the science/religion 
debate is perceived and reflected in public spaces, most particularly schools, the most 
pressing concern is not merely that Barbour’s classification does not depict the logical space 
in which theories can exist sufficiently accurately—which is, after all, to be expected from an 
early and pioneering systematisation of the field—but that, as a result of its inherent 
simplification, it fails to achieve its ultimate purpose, to encourage positive narratives about 
the interaction between science and religion. 
Despite his own intentions, Barbour’s classification has perhaps itself encouraged 
polarisation of the field because there lies a deep assumption about the division of labour 
within it. This is most clearly seen in his examples of positive interaction between science 
and religion. The communication between the fields is largely one-directional: scientific 
research papers land on the desks of theologians for them to work into a natural theology, 
systematic synthesis or wider metaphysics. Scientific progress, on the other hand, does not 
need the resulting worldview to be fed back to the laboratory: Barbour acknowledges that 
scientists need not raise wider questions about the order of the universe in the course of their 
work (1990). This means that the dialogue that is identified does not occur in the very midst 
of scientific practice, but at its outskirts. From the outset, Barbour’s vision of dialogue was 
not of the most deeply entwined interaction between science and religion. 
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It is in the application and use of Barbour’s classification, however, that the problem is 
greatest. Its four categories can too easily be unwittingly treated as mutually exclusive. 
Making this error forces a student, once encountering any conflict between science and 
religion, to choose between a position of conflict or of independence. Yet, in many areas of 
life, dialogue is most critical exactly when and where conflict exists. Mikael Stenmark’s 
alternative classification thus has an important advantage over Barbour’s: Stenmark gave less 
prominence to the factor of conflict when distinguishing the ways in which science and 
religion may relate (2004). He was careful to ensure that the existence of conflict between 
science and religion does not necessarily lead to the view that the fields are irreconcilable. 
Although Stenmark’s classification is more sophisticated than Barbour’s, however, we may 
begin to suspect that it is the very concept of a classification that is the source of the problem 
of polarisation. If our real concern is the development and portrayal of positive narratives 
regarding the interaction between science and religion, perhaps our best course of action is to 
get on with exactly that. I pause before doing so only to argue that this starting point can (and 
should) be accepted by believers and non-believers alike. 
2. The Unimportance of Conflict 
The concern that public opinion is polarised into positions of conflict or independence is most 
usually raised by those with religious affiliations, but there are many reasons to bring an 
atheist to accept that dialogue is possible and desirable between the two fields, even if he or 
she believes them to be in insurmountable epistemic conflict. In the first place, it seems a 
reasonable position to take, if one accepts the widely acknowledged point that Barbour’s 
classification is, understandably, philosophically unsophisticated (De Cruz, 2017; Stenmark, 
2004). It won’t do to close off debate because of the existence, in some quarters, of conflict. 
Given that there are profound conflicts between different sciences (or religions), between 
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parts of the same science (or religion), between members of the same laboratory (or place of 
worship), it would be remarkable to find an absence of conflict between science and religion 
as a whole. Stenmark is right: conflict isn’t so important in determining the relationship 
between science and religion. A humble atheist might also accept Alain de Botton’s argument 
that there is much for non-believers to learn and take from religious practices, because there 
are many elements of religion which people find helpful and alluring (2012). The atheist 
earns the title ‘humble’ by respecting public opinion. Such humility is called for because 
secularisation has not spread as rapidly nor as globally as expected by the early sociologists 
of the twentieth century (Stark, 2015). Whether wanting to restrict it or promote it, 
secularisation thus demands public engagement about science from all sides. Thirdly and 
finally, there is a growing concern that public acceptance of the conflict thesis deters the 
religiously minded from studying science. This is, indeed, one of the reasons for the 2009 
founding of the Learning About Science and Religion (LASAR) project. Enthusing young 
people about science, regardless of their religious affiliations, is something we should all be 
concerned with. 
Both atheist and believer should be troubled then, if the epistemic bias and simplicity of 
Barbour’s classification has encouraged a polarisation of public views. Criticisms have failed 
to keep this, the ultimate purpose of Barbour’s work, in mind: they do not explain the failure 
of the classification to encourage narratives of rich, two-way communication. I have 
suggested that this failure is, at least in part, a result of assuming a sharp division of labour 
between science and religion. For many, the assumption that science and religion have very 
different work to do is a fair one. A difference must be presumed, after all, for the fields to be 
compared at all. But we should perhaps wonder why we are so concerned to compare the two 
fields, if our real purpose is to communicate. The existence of conflict is to be expected and 
makes the need for interaction between the fields more urgent, not less. If we accept that 
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dialogue is possible and desirable, the debate regarding science and religion should be 
extended beyond classification, and be reoriented to deepen and enrich dialogue where it 
exists and to encourage it where it does not. It is against this background that I propose to 
entertain the idea that science contributes more than a collection of facts to moral decision-
making. The criticism of epistemic bias made of Barbour’s work can be taken one step 
further: instead of merely pointing out the neglect of religious experiences such as ritual, 
prayer and ceremony, we can go on to compare the moral consequences of participating in 
such activities with the moral consequences of participating in science. The suggestion here is 
that science and religion can conflict on moral grounds: engaging in scientific practice and 
education alters a person’s everyday moral outlook. 
Although it is true that recent debate has not sufficiently acknowledged the importance 
of religious experience, it has perhaps acknowledged scientific experience even less. It has 
been assumed that scientists, qua scientists, have nothing to add to moral decision-making 
other than facts. Exploring an alternative hypothesis promises to open new ground for 
dialogue between science and religion. I have argued so far that atheists and non-believers 
alike should bypass the question of classification and take the possibility of dialogue as a 
starting point for the debate regarding the relationship between science and religion. Whether 
this can be done by approaching the debate on moral terms, however, remains to be seen. The 
idea that science doesn’t just raise moral questions, but takes part in answering them contrasts 
sharply with the common-sense view that science tells us what we can do, but not what we 
should do. We shall see that historic attempts to deliver an ethics from science have largely 
been unsuccessful. I turn now to distinguish the hypothesis at hand from these failed projects 
of the past and, by doing so, to articulate it more clearly.  
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3. A Return to an Ethics of Science 
More than thirty years ago, Bernard Williams rallied against the apparent goal of modern 
philosophers to generate codified systems of morality, taking particular aim at Kantian ethics 
and utilitarianism (1985). In a perfectly codified system, the role of moral reasoning appears 
be restricted to the choice of initial axioms, from which all else follows by the application of 
logic. The principal variants of utilitarianism have customarily been interpreted in this way, 
resulting in a theory that has felt, even by its first critics, barren, dry and soulless (Macaulay, 
1860). Some utilitarian thinkers have gone further, rejecting the need for any moral kick-start 
to their system: J. S. Mill (1861) believed that humans ought to strive to maximise happiness 
because it was in their nature to desire happiness; today, Sam Harris (2004) takes a similar 
view when he argues that the right thing to do can be worked out entirely from fact. In its 
most extreme form, then—as exemplified by the logical positivists—the aim of deriving an 
ethics from science goes as far as denying that there is any such thing as moral knowledge at 
all. Public intuition, on the other hand, has been on Williams’ side, resistant to the idea of 
grounding morality in science. The commonsense view has been that science reveals how 
things are, but we must then, independently of science, decide what to do about those facts. 
For many philosophers, the commonsense view is supported by a compelling philosophical 
argument that is famously traced back to David Hume (1739). The naturalistic fallacy is a 
modern presentation of Hume’s argument: it is a mistake to derive moral principles (about 
what there ought to be) from factual ones (about what there is). Set against the naturalistic 
fallacy, any attempt to derive ethics from science appears naïve, possibly including the 
hypothesis presented here that scientific experience alters a person’s moral outlook. 
On the other hand, the hypothesis can appear entirely trivial. We take it for granted 
that experiences—including education of all kinds—bring about changes to our characters. If 
this is to mean very much, it should at least mean that experiences affect a person’s reactions 
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when faced with ordinary decisions that have a moral flavour. As absurd as it may seem to 
generate ethics from science, it may seem equally absurd to assume that study merely adds to 
a person’s knowledge, as if a person remains exactly as they were before learning, but with 
access to additional information in their memory. In the last 60 years, a series of 
philosophical arguments for the subjective nature of science has challenged the correctness of 
making a sharp distinction between what a person knows to be true and what a person 
believes to be right (Barnes and Bloor, 1982; Kuhn, 1962; Longino, 1990). In particular, 
philosophers have suggested that scientists must turn to values, in addition to factual data, 
when making a choice between two competing theories (Kuhn, 1962). They have also 
suggested that values are necessary to interpret scientific data and reach scientific conclusions 
(Douglas, 2009). Note that philosophical work in this vein has identified particular situations 
where values play a role in scientific work and this is what philosophers are referring to when 
they report that, “Science is subjective.” A statement of this kind should not immediately be 
taken to mean, therefore, that science is irrational, that values permeate all areas of the 
sciences equally and universally, or that science is subjective to the same extent or in similar 
ways to other fields. 
Against the philosophical literature of recent times, then, the hypothesis that science 
alters moral outlook is an unsurprising one. However, the philosophical arguments to date 
have emphasised the ways in which science relies upon values, and thus challenged the idea 
that science has a special status as the primary source of reliable and objective knowledge. 
The blurring of lines between science and religion has yet to be explored in the opposite 
direction: if values play a more profound role in generating facts, might not facts play a more 
profound role in generating values? In this way, the hypothesis that science alters moral 
values is a logical step forward from the current philosophical discussion regarding the 
relationship between fact and value. 
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It nevertheless remains to distinguish the hypothesis that science alters moral outlook 
from its failed (and extreme) predecessors in the history of ethics. I do so in three ways, by 
emphasising: the empirical nature of the hypothesis; its mundane focus; and its attention to 
change. In the first place, there is no derivation here of statements of value from statements of 
fact, as Hume argued was impossible. It is not suggested that a logical connection exists 
between the two. The statement ‘we should not eat meat’ cannot be derived from our 
scientific theories. Yet, it is plausible that certain scientific practices increase (or decrease) 
the chances that a person becomes vegetarian. If those scientific practices are widespread, it 
will have an impact on the moral outlook of our society. An ethics resulting from science 
need not, then, be a top-down, logical system of morals. This means that the causal 
connections between scientific experience and moral outlook may be difficult, even with 
hindsight, to explain. It has been common in moral psychology to make this assumption since 
Simone Schnall et al. reported that being asked to wash your hands before entering an 
interview room affects your moral judgements during the interview (2008). Even in cases 
where the causal connection is plausible, it remains an empirical result that requires testing to 
demonstrate. It is possible, for example, to present plausible explanations of why conducting 
medical research on rats is more likely to bring a scientist to vegetarianism, if research were 
to reveal this causal connection. It is equally possible to provide plausible explanations of 
why conducting medical research on rats has the opposite effect. The rationale takes 
secondary place, after empirical research has ascertained the conclusion to be drawn.  
Secondly, the focus here is on the moral decisions that are met with when going about 
the ordinary business of living. Should a lover who no longer wishes to be in a relationship 
wait until her partner has completed a course of chemotherapy before revealing her feelings? 
Should the able-bodied childminder leave the buggy outside the toilet cubicle or go instead 
with the buggy into the disabled cubicle? Should a parent allow a five-year-old to become a 
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vegan? Situations of this kind cannot be easily solved by logic because they are not simple 
exemplifications of general moral principles. Furthermore, conducting empirical research into 
the relationship between scientific experience and everyday moral outlook will not reveal 
high-level claims regarding how we should act. What is being sought is evidence of the 
impact of a particular scientific experience upon a particular aspect of a person’s beliefs, 
inclinations, judgements, behaviours or dispositions, that are demonstrated in everyday life. (I 
generally use ‘outlook’ to avoid prioritising between these qualities and to thus avoid making 
assumptions regarding the metaphysics of mind; I also leave the question open regarding 
what counts as a scientific experience and do not claim that there is any profound or 
meaningful distinction between this and any other kind of experience.) There is no 
assumption made here about what characterises morally good behaviour, but it is assumed 
that we can distinguish moral decisions (in which we can respond more rightly or more 
wrongly) from non-moral ones (in which there is no right thing to do). A person’s moral 
outlook is then understood to be the collection of their reactions when faced (possibly 
counterfactually) with such decisions. 
Finally, the hypothesis is framed to consider changes to a person’s moral outlook. 
From this perspective, there is no seeking of the ultimate source of morals. Because the focus 
is on everyday living, there cannot be a moral void into which science steps: we are forced to 
make these kinds of moral decisions by living our lives, and in doing so we demonstrate a 
moral outlook. As a result, even if scientific experience is found to alter morality, it is not the 
only generator of value. 
The resulting claim is still a challenging one for some believers, especially for those 
who believe that their religious institution provides the only guidance on moral matters. But 
if a believer accepts that family, friends, and many other influences can help a person to live 
a better life, it is plausible that learning about the natural world may do so too. What is more, 
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there is no assumption here, as has been associated with historical attempts to derive ethics 
from science, that an alteration to morality brought about by science is necessarily an 
improvement. It is because of this that the hypothesis presented here provides a new platform 
for the debate between religion and science: once an effect of scientific (or religious) 
experience is revealed, it remains to be debated whether the change is desirable or not.  
This sketch of how a modern ethics from science should differ from those of the past 
has implications for a theory of morals required to support it. It requires a moral philosophy 
that allows for progress in morality, that focusses on the mundane, that is open to many moral 
sources, that has an empirical aspect, and that looks to experience as well as belief. These are 
stringent and high demands to place upon a theory of morals and much philosophical work is 
yet to be done to provide such a framework. The philosophical motivation for doing so would 
be to take the argument for the subjective nature of science to its logical ends. In addition, 
there is a theological motivation for this work, to steer between the polarising position of 
conflict and independence in the science/religion debate and to encourage richer dialogue 
between the two fields. I see the primary purpose of this work, however, to be in education: 
how does the study of science impact upon the moral outlook of children? In the penultimate 
section of this chapter, Section 5, I assess the most relevant research completed in this area to 
date and explore how best it might be continued in the future. Before that, I reveal some 
evidence that indicates that bypassing the problem of polarisation may be more difficult than 
I have so far suggested. 
4. Evidence of Changing Attitudes in Children 
There is no assumption here that scientific experience is superior to religious experience for 
the development of a person’s morality. Yet, it does challenge members of religious 
communities in a new and potentially difficult way, to open the debate on how we become 
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better people to sources other than religious authorities. On the face of it, the research 
envisaged does not answer the question of what it is to be good but, once goodness is agreed, 
how to go about embodying and implementing that goodness in everyday life. Because the 
many believers and non-believers alike, for example, can agree that it is a good thing to 
regularly donate to charity, a discovery of the kind that studying chemistry brings people to 
give more to charity than listening to sermons does would be worth analysis and debate. A 
fundamental disagreement between atheists and believers may well remain in the ensuing 
conversation regarding the ultimate source against which morality is measured. Those 
without religious commitments are more likely to assume that moral judgements can only be 
made by the lights of previous experience. From this perspective, scientific and religious 
experience may make an equal contribution towards our moral judgement. Those with 
religious commitments, however, are more likely to assume that they should, at least in part, 
assess the impact of scientific experience against moral requirements revealed through 
religious practice, tradition and teaching. From this perspective, science and religion cannot 
have an equal impact upon moral judgement. The religious community may sense a deeper 
and more threatening challenge here, then, to the priority of religion in matters of value. 
The situation echoes, perhaps, the challenge felt, from the time of Thomas Kuhn’s 
work onwards, by some scientists to the priority of science in matters of fact. As a result of 
Kuhn’s work, it is more readily accepted by the philosophical community today that our 
commitment to the rationality of science is based on conviction. Indeed, Gary Gutting has 
argued that this no longer remains an argument, but is an example of knowledge secured by  
philosophers in the latter half of the twentieth century (2009). (This is not to say, as Gutting 
emphasises, that philosophers have concluded that science is irrational or based on personal 
prejudice.) I suggest that the growing appreciation for how science makes use of values has 
not reduced public confidence in the institutions of science. Similarly, I propose that 
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exploring its subjective aspects further, to consider the possibility that it generates values, 
need not reduce public confidence in the equally robust institutions of religion. 
The persistence of public attitudes, however, casts doubt on the theological 
motivation for this work. I have suggested that viewing science as an influencer of values, 
and thus permitting the two fields to debate on a more equal footing regarding moral 
questions, will offset the unintended polarising consequence of Barbour’s classification. One 
reason for thinking that this line of reasoning may be overly optimistic is that viewing science 
as a consumer of values does not appear to have a similar effect. The conflict thesis—the idea 
that science and religion are irreconcilable—remains strong, despite the increasing 
acceptance within the philosophical community—and possibly wider communities—that 
science has subjective elements. 
My own experiences with undergraduates of philosophy of science over the last 
twenty years suggest that there has indeed been a growing acceptance in the UK of the 
subjectivity of science, although this has not obviously reduced the popularity of the conflict 
thesis. I have conducted a pilot study in two Cambridgeshire secondary schools to test this 
hypothesis further. It indicates that children today may indeed be more aware of the 
subjective nature of science than they were twenty years ago. 
In 2015-2016 academic year, I administered a questionnaire to Year 7 students (aged 
11 to 12) at a co-educational state secondary school (serving 1,400 students aged 11 to 18). I 
administered the same questionnaire in the 2016-2017 academic year to Year 8 students 
(aged 12 to 13) at a second co-educational state secondary school (serving 1,300 students 
aged 11 to 16). The “Large Scale Exploration of Pupils’ Understanding of Nature of Science” 
questionnaire (LSE) was developed and validated by Joan Solomon, Linda Scott and Jon 
Duveen (1996). It consists of five multiple-choice items. The fifth item of the questionnaire 
(shown in Fig. 1) asks students why old scientific theories are replaced by new ones. 
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Solomon et al. presented four options for students to choose from and accepted three of these 
as adequate responses. An old theory might be replaced as a result of (a) newer technology, 
(b) new evidence, or (c) because people at different times have a different way of explaining. 
They took the fourth option, (d), that scientific theories are replaced when older experimental 
results are proved wrong by newer ones, to indicate a less developed view of scientific 
progress. 
 
Fig. 1 Item 5 from the LSE questionnaire 
administered in 2016 and 2017 at two 
Cambridgeshire secondary schools, originally 
published by Solomon, Scott and Duveen (1996). 
Solomon et al. considered (a), (b) and (c) to be 
adequate responses to the question.  
 
The item addresses one particular aspect of the subjectivity of science. In the first half 
of the twentieth century, logical positivists promoted an objective view of the progression of 
scientific theories: a clear-cut distinction was made between theories that had been falsified 
and those that had not; the decision to replace one by another was a purely logical one, that 
was (at least theoretically) computable. Students who select the fourth option (d) are 
demonstrating a viewpoint of this kind. In contrast, Thomas Kuhn, following a long line of 
others, argued that scientists do not choose theories in an algorithmic way (1962). Students 
with a more subjective view of science, along the lines of Kuhn’s, are more likely to respond 
to this item with option (c). It should be noted, however, that the item does not address the 
role that values play in theory change directly and therefore we label option (d) as a ‘more 






Fig. 2 The responses of students to the fifth item of the LSE (shown in Fig. 1). The comparison shows that 
students were more likely to give the answer (d) twenty years ago, indicating a more objective view of science. 
The numerical data from 1996 was interpreted from a graph (1996). When students in 2016 and 2017 responded 
with two options, each was given a score of 0.5. 
 
Solomon and her colleagues administered the LSE to 126 British students in Year 8 in 
1996. In 2016, I gave it to 31 students in Year 7; in 2017, I gave it to 30 students in Year 8. 
The results are shown in Fig. 2. They show a statistically significant decrease (p < .001) in 
the number of students opting for option (d) in the recent tests (4%) compared with the 
original test (17%). (The p value has been calculated by applying Pearson’s chi-squared test.) 
This is an intriguing result from a pilot study but one which cannot be readily 
generalised to a wider population. In particular, post-questionnaire interviews conducted with 
the Year 7 students demonstrated that these students held a much more nuanced 
understanding of science than had been captured by the LSE. These interviews therefore 
revealed the limitations of this research method. Indeed, since this questionnaire was 
developed there has been a growing understanding of the complexities of eliciting students’ 
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are better elicited by open-ended methods (Lederman et al., 1998). This pilot study was 
restricted because it required data from the past, a more thorough study of children’s current 
attitudes to the subjectivity of science would use improved elicitation tools. 
Further research is also required to discover whether children who view science as 
more subjective are less likely to accept the conflict thesis. Perhaps the conflict thesis is 
becoming less entrenched in public thought as Russell took it to be in 2002. If so, we may be 
more optimistic about the growth of dialogue between science and religion and of the path I 
am advocating of how to move the science/religion debate beyond Barbour. It is also 
possible, however, that children are continuing to accept the conflict thesis despite (and even 
because of) their growing recognition of the more subjective elements of science. It may be 
easier to discard scientific ideas that disagree with one’s own if science is too lazily labelled 
‘subjective’. Such a conclusion would cast doubt on the idea that recognising the similarities 
between science and religion can reduce the problem of polarisation. 
5. Testing the Moral Impact of Scientific Education 
So far, I have presented a claim—that practising or studying science alters a person’s moral 
outlook—and attempted to make it at least palatable. I have situated this claim in an old 
debate regarding the conflict between science and religion, arguing that it provides a new 
platform for a richer dialogue. I have then articulated it against philosophical literature by 
distinguishing it from historical attempts to generate ethics from science. One way in which it 
differs to the claims of the philosophical literature (and requires a non-standard theory of 
morals) is that it is empirical in nature. It is, indeed, perhaps best tested as a claim of moral 
psychology, by administering of questionnaires and by conducting psychological tasks to 
measure scientific experience and moral outlook. 
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To date, the largest study broadly of the kind envisaged here was undertaken by Jean 
Decety and his colleagues, who investigated the correlation between the religiosity of 
households and the altruism of children in those households (2015). The study was of 1,170 
children aged between 5 and 12 years, living in six countries (Canada, China, Jordan, Turkey, 
USA and South Africa). The religiosity of each child’s household was measured by a 
questionnaire completed by parents and guardians. The altruism of the children was measured 
by psychological testing. A version of the ‘dictator game’ was played: the children were 
shown 30 stickers and allowed to choose 10 stickers to keep; on being informed that not 
everyone in their school could take part, they were then given the option of giving some of 
their stickers away. The study found a negative correlation between the religiousness of a 
child’s household and the number of stickers the child donated. If a further correlation is then 
accepted between atheism and the practice of science, a conclusion can be drawn regarding 
the correlation between science and altruism that is very broadly of the kind under 
consideration here: scientific practice is positively correlated with altruistic behaviour. 
The truth of this claim is not of immediate importance here. It is useful to us only as a 
point of comparison. There is no work that I know of that directly supports the hypothesis of 
this chapter. The work of Decety et al. differs from what is needed because it is not a causal 
claim of the kind we are looking for: the kindness of the children could not be attributed to 
their own scientific experience and education. Furthermore, this research did not measure 
changes in the children’s kindness. Nevertheless, the psychological tasks of the kind used by 
Decety et al. would be suitable tools to compare the changes in moral outlook of students 
undertaking scientific study with those who are not. In the U.K., the most obvious point to 
administer such tests would be when students begin specialised two-year courses of study at 
the age of 16. Students with previously similar educational backgrounds are able at this point 
to take very different paths, some continuing with formal scientific education (following a 
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timetable that is mostly or entirely composed of science) and others dropping it entirely. The 
testing would then be retaken at the end of these specialised courses, providing the 
opportunity to discover if students’ moral outlooks have diverged according to their choice of 
study. 
Another difference with the work of Decety et al. is that we cannot yet identify what 
kinds of moral outlook we are interested to measure. We are considering the possibility of 
causal connections between scientific experience and morality that are not easily recognised 
and reasoned for. It is not clear at the beginning of the research, therefore, what psychological 
tests should be selected. Before psychological tests are conducted, it will be necessary to 
identify plausible relationships between areas of scientific study and moral outlook. This 
would perhaps best be achieved with a large-scale series of questionnaires designed to track 
the moral outlook of students through their specialised studies. Questionnaires of this kind 
have been designed and validated by researchers for similar purposes, most notably the Moral 
Foundations Questionnaire, developed by Jesse Graham, Jonathan Haidt, and Brian Nosek 
(2009). Adaptations could be made to tailor such questionnaires for teenagers and the specific 
moral decisions they face, covering topics of social media, relationships, animals, the 
environment and responsibility. The advantages of such an approach are that it is possible to 
address a wide range of topics and to reach many students, studying different sciences. On 
the other hand, it will not directly test students’ moral outlook, but only their self-reported 
moral beliefs. Having identified potential causal connections, it would then be necessary to 
back up such research with smaller scale psychological testing. 
6.  A Vision of Dialogue on Non-Epistemic Grounds 
I have attempted to articulate the hypothesis, in a way that avoids both triviality and 
absurdity, that engaging in scientific practice and education alters a person’s everyday moral 
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outlook. I have considered how this claim can be tested empirically. Evidence that scientific 
experience impacts upon a person’s morality would call for richer dialogue between two 
great pillars of society, those of science and religion. Such research has the potential, then, of 
taking the science/religion debate beyond Barbour’s delineation of the field. Instead of 
classifying how science and religion can or should interact with each other, the vision 
presented here is of how we should get on with that interaction. In particular, it raises the 
question of how we live our lives above that of what there is in our world. It is, after all, a 
question for all of us, in all our capacities, to consider. 
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